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Abstract 
 
Background:  Until recently, little was known about the costs of the HIV/AIDS epidemic to 
businesses in Africa and business responses to the epidemic. This paper synthesizes the 
results of a set of studies conducted between 1999 and 2006 and draws conclusions about the 
role of the private sector in Africa’s response to AIDS. 
 
Methods:  Detailed human resource, financial, and medical data were collected from 14 large 
private and parastatal companies in South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Ethiopia.  
Surveys of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were conducted in South Africa, 
Kenya, and Zambia.  Large companies’ responses or potential responses to the epidemic were 
investigated in South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Rwanda.    
 
Results:  Among the large companies, estimated workforce HIV prevalence ranged from 5%-
37%.  The average cost per employee lost to AIDS varied from 0.5-5.6 times the average 
annual compensation of the employee affected.  Labor cost increases as a result of AIDS 
were estimated at anywhere from 0.6%-10.8% but exceeded 3% at only 2 of 14 companies.  
Treatment of eligible employees with ART at a cost of $360/patient/year was shown to have 
positive financial returns for most but not all companies.  Uptake of employer-provided 
testing and treatment services varied widely.  Among SMEs, HIV prevalence in the 
workforce was estimated at 10%-26%.  SME managers consistently reported low AIDS-
related employee attrition, little concern about the impacts of AIDS on their companies, and 
relatively little interest in taking action, and fewer than half had ever discussed AIDS with 
their senior staff.  AIDS was estimated to increase the average operating costs of small 
tourism companies in Zambia by less than 1%; labor cost increases in other sectors were 
probably smaller.   
 
Conclusions:  Although there was wide variation among the firms studied, clear patterns 
emerged that will permit some prediction of impacts and responses in the future.   
 
 
Key words:  Africa, HIV/AIDS, private sector 
 
 
Correspondence to:  Sydney Rosen, sbrosen@bu.edu.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the past six years, the authors and their colleagues at the Center for International Health 
and Development (CIHD) at Boston University in Boston, Massachusetts have investigated 
the impact of HIV/AIDS on the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa and the private sector’s 
response to the epidemic.  Primary data have been collected in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia small, medium-sized, and large companies and across 
most major industrial sectors, including mining, agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism.   
 
From this experience, our continuing review of the published and unpublished literature, and 
ongoing discussions with business leaders, donor agencies, and service providers, we have 
reached certain conclusions about the impact of the epidemic on business and the role that the 
private sector can play in responding to HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.  We believe that as 
employers, private sector businesses can make an important contribution to fighting the 
epidemic.  We are not convinced, however, that the private sector will, or even should, play a 
role as central as that suggested by the most vociferous advocates of corporate social 
responsibility.   
 
In this paper, we summarize the evidence from our studies which leads to these conclusions.  
Based on our experience, we identify the determinants of impacts and suggest the limits of 
the private sector response.  It should be noted that the studies we draw upon in this paper are 
a not a comprehensive inventory of research on AIDS and business, nor are they 
representative of all countries or sectors.  Our objective is to identify common factors in how 
the AIDS epidemic is affecting companies in Africa and their responses to it and propose 
some general conclusions from our own research experience.  In so doing, we aim to help  
define the next phase of research and action.  
 
2.  Background  
 
A vast literature exists on the extent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa and its 
impact—real and potential—on various sectors of society.1-3  For our purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that HIV prevalence exceeds 10 percent of working aged adults in several countries in 
southern Africa and ranges from 5 to 10 percent in most of eastern and central and some of 
west Africa.  In the hardest hit countries, such as Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, and 
Lesotho, more than 20 percent of working-aged adults are HIV-positive.1  Mortality among 
15-60 year olds has more than doubled,4 and life expectancy at birth has fallen to below 45 in 
several countries.5 
 
Concern about the potential impact of AIDS-related morbidity and mortality on private sector 
labor productivity, production costs, and competitiveness arose in the mid-1990s.6  By the 
end of that decade, there were anecdotal reports of AIDS-induced shortages of skilled 
workers, rising absenteeism, and skyrocketing benefits costs.7  Most information came, 
however, from case studies of a few large and high-profile firms.  Little rigorous analysis had 
been done to support the claims of major impacts or document the specific ways in which 
HIV/AIDS could affect a company. 
 
As business leaders and policy analysts began to consider the financial implications of AIDS 
among formally employed workers, international and domestic advocacy organizations 
ramped up the pressure on multinational companies, in particular, to participate more actively 
in the global response to AIDS.  Employers were exhorted, at a minimum, to provide care 
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and treatment for their own HIV-positive workers.8;9  Broader proposals included providing 
services for the communities in which the companies were located and requiring suppliers 
and distributors to have HIV/AIDS programs as well.10 
 
External and internal pressure and a recognition of the costs of not taking action have 
motivated some private firms in Africa to invest in comprehensive HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment programs and pioneer innovative public-private partnerships.  The vast majority of 
companies, however, have done little or nothing,11 and many have tried to diminish the need 
for action by changing their levels and conditions of employment.12  The appropriate role of 
the private sector in fighting the epidemic, moreover, remains an unaddressed question in 
most countries.  Calls for businesses to invest more in HIV/AIDS programs for employees 
risk the possibility that companies will respond by relocating to lower-prevalence parts of the 
world, casualizing previously permanent workers, or substituting capital for labor.  Few if 
any countries have sought or found a reasonable balance. 
 
If the private sector is to take a broader role in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic, African 
business and government leaders will need answers to several questions:  What is the cost of 
HIV/AIDS to private sector employers of different sizes and in different industrial sectors?  
Where does the epidemic rank as a management priority?  What is the return on employer 
investments in prevention and treatment?  Where do private companies fit in national 
responses to AIDS, particularly in light of the large sums of money now being invested by 
international donors? 
 
In this paper, we draw together evidence from a wide range of countries and industrial sectors  
to offer our own answers to these questions.  The studies we cite were conducted by 
researchers from the Center for International Health and Development at Boston University 
and our colleagues in African institutions between 1999 and 2006.  The research is by no 
means exhaustive, and the results are specific to the times and places of data collection.  
Taken together, however, we believe that these studies offer the best information yet 
available on HIV/AIDS and the private sector in Africa.   
 
3.  Analytic Framework 
 
The possible impacts of HIV/AIDS on an organization are wide-ranging and go well beyond 
those arising from HIV infection in the workforce itself.  A private sector company may see 
changes in the prices of inputs or the preferences of consumers and face higher transactions 
costs in its interactions with government and labor.  For some companies, illness and deaths 
among employees will be the most important consequences of the epidemic; for others, 
external (market-level) effects will dominate.  Figure 1 illustrates the three levels at which 
HIV/AIDS can impose costs on a company and the types of costs arising at each level.  In the 
diagram, increased expenses or “direct costs” (column a) are recurrent operating expenses, 
while lost productivity or “indirect costs” (column b) are reductions in productivity or 
revenues resulting from HIV/AIDS. 
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Figure 1:  Costs of HIV/AIDS to a company 
 
 a.  Increased expenses 
(Direct costs) 
b.  Lost productivity 
(Indirect costs) 
 
I.  From one 
employee with 
HIV/AIDS 
(individual costs)  
• Benefits payments 
• Medical care 
• Recruitment of a replacement 
worker 
• Training of a replacement worker 
• Increased leave and absenteeism 
• Reduced on-the-job productivity 
• Supervisor’s time 
• Vacancy until replacement is hired 
• Poorer performance due to replacement’s 
inexperience 
 
II.  From many 
employees with 
HIV/AIDS 
(organizational 
costs)  
• Benefits premiums 
• Accidents due to sick or 
inexperienced employees 
• Litigation over benefits, dismissals, 
etc. 
• Consultants to provide relevant 
expertise 
• Production disruptions due to missing skills, 
accidents, vacant positions, etc. 
• Loss of institutional memory and experience  
• Breakdown of workforce morale and 
cohesion 
• Diversion of senior managers’ time  
• Deteriorating labor relations 
 
III.  From high HIV 
prevalence in 
society (market or 
external costs) 
• Higher cost of material inputs 
• More security needed due to 
breakdown in civil society 
• Higher wages due to shortage of 
skilled workers 
• Reduced demand for products 
• Higher risk premium on investment 
• Higher cost of capital 
• Higher cost of transactions with government 
and labor 
 
 Total Costs of HIV/AIDS  
Source:  adapted from 13   
 
The research discussed in this paper primarily concerns the internal costs of HIV/AIDS in the 
workforce (Levels I and II).  To the extent that market or external costs (Level III) have been 
considered, it has mainly been by macroeconomic modelers working with aggregate, 
national-level data.2  The impact of such potential problems as a breakdown in social 
cohesion leading to a greater need for physical security has not been estimated, to our 
knowledge. 
 
Within the workforce (Levels I and II), direct costs that arise from individual employees with 
HIV/AIDS (Ia) are relatively predictable and easy to measure.  Those that stem from multiple 
cases (IIa) can be less predictable or require data that few organizations have.  Indirect costs 
arising from individual cases (Ib) are difficult to measure, since the productivity of an 
individual worker is difficult to observe and may depend on the performance of an entire 
team.  Hardest of all to quantify are the productivity losses resulting from multiple cases of 
HIV/AIDS (IIb).  These include such impacts as diminishing employee morale, the disruption 
of established work teams, the reduced efficiency of a workforce that has less experience and 
probably less skill, an increase in labor disputes as benefits and job security come under 
pressure, and the burden imposed on managers who must cope with worker illness and 
deaths.  Most of these costs are hidden, and in some cases they will not become evident until 
the epidemic is well advanced.   
 
The long lag time between infection with HIV and death from AIDS—9-10 years on average 
in the absence of antiretroviral therapy (ART)14—makes this disease different from almost 
any other health problem a company, or a society, might face.  Figure 2 is a timeline that 
reflects the natural progression of the disease, when treatment is not available.  Although the 
costs are incurred over a long period of time and usually do not begin until several years after 
infection, an employer in principle acquires the liability for that stream of future costs from 
the moment the employee is infected with HIV.  As long as the employee remains in that 
company’s workforce and does not have access to effective treatment, these costs are 
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inevitable.  Companies in Africa are now bearing the costs of HIV infections that were 
acquired by employees as long as a decade ago. 
 
Figure 2:  Timing of cases and costs in the absence of effective treatment 
 
Source:  adapted from 13 
 
4.  Data Sets 
 
Three main types of data were used for this research.  First, we collected detailed human 
resource, financial, and medical data from more than a dozen large private and parastatal 
companies in South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Ethiopia.  These data were used to 
generate quantitative estimates of the costs of HIV/AIDS to these companies, based on a 
previously described methodology.15  Second, we conducted surveys of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in various industrial sectors in South Africa, Kenya, and Zambia.  
The survey instrument elicited information about the current impact and costs of HIV/AIDS, 
managers’ perceptions of that impact, and company responses.16  Finally, we examined large 
companies’ responses, interventions, or potential interventions, focusing largely but not 
exclusively on treatment, in South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Rwanda.  Some of 
these studies have been published; most others are available as project reports.  The studies 
used in this paper are listed in Table 1.  Each study in Table 1 is given a study reference that 
will be used to identify individual studies in the remainder of this paper. 
 
 
Progression of HIV/AIDS 
in the Workforce 
Cost to Employer 
Sickness begins (some early deaths, some 
long-term survivors) 
Employee becomes infected with HIV virus 
Employee leaves workforce due to death or 
retirement (some long-term survivors) 
Company hires replacement employee 
(some employees not replaced) 
No cost to employer at this stage 
Illness-related costs are incurred 
(absenteeism, productivity, management time, 
medical care) 
Termination-related costs are incurred 
(payouts from retirement fund, funeral 
expenses, loss of morale, experience, and 
cohesion) 
Replacement-related costs are incurred  
(vacancy, recruiting, training, reduced 
productivity) 
Timeline 
(illustrative) 
Year 0 
Year 7-9 
Year 9-10 
Year 10-11 
Employee remains well and fully productive No cost to employer at this stage Year 0-8 
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Table 1:  Studies included in this paper 
 
Study 
referencea 
Country Yearb Focus of study Sector and location Sourcec 
Studies of individual large companies 
Co. 1 So. Afr. 2003 Cost of AIDS Utility, many provinces Unpublished
Co. 2 So. Afr. 1999 Cost of AIDS Commercial agriculture, 
KwaZulu Natal Prov. 
15 
Co. 3 So. Afr. 2001 Cost of AIDS Mining, many provinces 15 
Co. 4 So. Afr. 2001 Cost of AIDS Retail, KwaZulu Natal 
Province 
15 
Co. 5 So. Afr. 2001 Cost of AIDS Media, many provinces 15 
Co. 6 So. Afr. 2002 Cost of AIDS Manufacturing, Gauteng 
Province 
Unpublished
Co. 7 Botswana 2000 Cost of AIDS Mining, northern Botswana 15 
Co. 8 Uganda 2003 Cost of AIDS Manufacturing,  western 
Uganda 
17 
Co. 9 Uganda 2003 Cost of AIDS Commercial agriculture, 
many locations 
17 
Co. 10 Zambia 2005 Cost of AIDS Tourism, Livingstone District 18 
Co. 11 Zambia 2005 Cost of AIDS Commercial agriculture, 
Central Province 
19 
Co. 12 Kenya 2004 Cost of AIDS and 
impact on productivity 
Commercial agriculture, 
Kericho District 
20 
Co. 13 Kenya 2002 Impact on productivity Commercial agriculture, 
Kericho District 
21 
Co. 14 Rwanda 2005 VCT uptake Manufacturing, Kigali and 
Gisenyi 
22 
Co.15 Ethiopia 2005 Cost of AIDS Manufacturing, Addis Ababa 23 
Co. 16 Ethiopia 2005 Cost of AIDS Manufacturing, Addis Ababa 23 
Company surveys 
Survey 1 So. Afr. 2004 SMEd impacts and 
responses 
Multiple sectors, Gauteng 
and KwaZulu Natal 
Provinces 
16 
Survey 2 So. Afr. 2005 SME impacts and 
responses 
Multiple sectors, industrial 
area in Gauteng Province 
24 
Survey 3 So. Afr. 2005 Provision and uptake 
of treatment  
Multiple sectors, nationwide 25 
Survey 4 Uganda 2004 Company responses Multiple sectors, nationwide 26 
Survey 5 Zambia 2005 SME impacts and 
responses 
Tourism, Livingstone District 18 
Survey 6 Zambia 2006 SME impacts and 
responses 
Commercial agriculture, 
Lusaka District 
19 
Survey 7 Kenya 2005 SME impacts and 
responses 
Commercial agriculture, 
Kericho District 
20 
aStudy references will be used to identify individual studies in the remainder of this paper. 
bYear in which data collection was completed. 
cMost project reports and some published papers are available from 
http://www.bu.edu/dbin/sph/research_centers/cih_impact_hiv.php.  
dSmall and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
5.  Cost of AIDS to Large Companies 
 
Between 1999 and 2005, we made detailed estimates of the costs of HIV/AIDS in the 
workforce to the 14 large companies shown in Table 1 for which the focus of the study was 
the cost of AIDS.  At these companies, we combined retrospective data on employee 
demographic characteristics, absenteeism, productivity, and medical care costs; employment 
contracts and benefits policies; managers’ estimates or calculations of the costs of recruiting 
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and training replacement workers; and recent financial statements to estimate the cost of 
losing one employee to HIV/AIDS at each major job level.  We then estimated AIDS-related 
mortality in the workforce and multiplied the nominal cost per death by the estimated number 
of deaths in the year of the study to obtain the aggregate costs of all AIDS-related losses per 
year.  Results for some companies differ from those in previously published work because 
they are not discounted, are based on mortality rather than incidence, and are expressed in 
relation to total compensation (salary plus benefits), rather than base salary alone. 
 
Table 2 summarizes our findings.  It is organized by industrial sector, to illustrate differences 
and similarities across and within sectors.  With the exception of Companies 10 and 11, all of 
the cost studies were conducted prior to the widespread availability of antiretroviral therapy.  
ART appears to have reduced the costs to Company 10 shown in Table 2 substantially, as we 
will discuss later in the paper.   
 
Table 2:  Estimated cost of HIV/AIDS to large companies in the base year of the study, in the 
absence of effective treatment 
 
Sector, country, and  
study referencea 
Approx. 
workforce 
size 
Estimated  
workforce HIV 
prevalence in 
year of studyb
Average cost per 
AIDS-related 
termination  
(multiple of average 
annual compensation)g
“AIDS Tax”:  
aggregate costs 
in base year 
(% of total annual 
compensation)g 
Commercial agriculturec     
South Africa (Co 2) 7,000 23.7% 1.1 0.7%e 
Uganda (Co 9) 500 5.6% 1.9 1.2% 
Kenya (Co 12) 22,000 10.0% 1.1 1.0%e 
Zambia (Co 11) 1,200 28.5% 0.9 1.3%de 
Mining     
Botswana (Co 7) 500 29.0% 4.4 8.4% 
South Africa (Co 3) 600 23.6% 1.4 2.4% 
Manufacturing     
South Africa (Co 6) 1,300 14.0% 1.2 1.1% 
Uganda (Co 8) 300 14.4% 1.2 1.9% 
Ethiopia (Co 15) 1,500 5.3% 0.9 0.6% 
Ethiopia (Co 16) 1,300 6.2% 0.8 0.6% 
Other     
So. Afr. (retail) (Co 4) 500 10.5% 0.7 0.5%e 
So. Afr. (media) (Co 5) 3,600 10.2% 1.3 1.3% 
So. Afr. (utility) (Co 1) >25,000 11.7% 4.7 2.2%e 
Zambia (tourism) (Co 
10) 
350 36.8% 3.6 10.8%f 
aStudy references are shown in Table 1. 
bPrevalence estimates were based on anonymous workplace HIV seroprevalence surveys, modeling from population data, 
modeling from observed mortality, or a combination of these methods, depending on available data. 
cCommercial agriculture includes producing, purchasing, processing, and/or marketing agricultural products; not all companies 
are engaged in all of these activities. 
dThis estimate is based on observed rather than estimated AIDS mortality; costs based on estimated mortality would be 
substantially higher than shown. 
eIncludes non-permanent workers, such as casual and seasonal workers. 
fTreatment of eligible employees with antiretroviral therapy appears to have reduced the cost of AIDS to Company 10 
substantially below what is shown, as is discussed later in this paper. 
gCompensation includes base salary or wage plus benefits. 
 
With the exception of the mining company in Botswana (Company 7) and the tourism 
company in Zambia (Company 10), in no company studied did the estimated annual costs of 
losing employees to HIV/AIDS, taken as a percentage of annual labor costs—what we have 
elsewhere dubbed the “AIDS tax,”15 exceed 3 percent.  For most companies, HIV/AIDS 
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appears to be raising the cost of labor by 1-2 percent.  This should be regarded as a 
conservative estimate of the true costs of AIDS in the workforce, as it omits many of the 
organizational (level II) costs in Figure 1.  As is the case for Companies 7 and 10, however, 
there are also firms that are facing a much larger AIDS tax.  In both of these cases, estimated 
HIV prevalence was very high.  Since both Botswana and Zambia had relatively mature 
epidemics at the time of the studies, AIDS-related morbidity and mortality was thus also 
high.  Finally, both companies provided generous employee benefits, leading to very high 
overall costs. 
 
Direct costs such as benefits, recruitment, and training can be estimated relatively easily, and 
large companies can also usually predict the duration of vacancies and the time required for a 
new worker to become fully productive.  Indirect costs associated with morbidity—losses of 
productivity due to absenteeism and diminished performance when at work (so-called 
“impaired presenteeism”)—are much harder to quantify, largely because productivity cannot 
usually be observed directly.  Wherever possible, we used routinely-collected payroll data to 
compare the productivity and absenteeism of workers who died of AIDS-related causes to 
those of workers still present in the workforce.  In the non-agriculture companies in South 
Africa, Uganda, and Zambia, we found that in their last two years of service, employees who 
ultimately died of AIDS or suspected AIDS were on leave or absent from work anywhere 
from 18 to 50 days more than other employees—the equivalent of roughly 1 to 3 months of 
lost working time over the 24 months of observation. 
 
Perhaps the best data on productivity loss associated with AIDS come from two commercial 
agriculture firms in Kenya, Companies 12 and 13 in Table 1.  Both are tea growers and 
processors whose workforces consist largely of tea pluckers.  Because tea pluckers are paid 
on the basis of the quantity of tea plucked per day, these companies keep daily records of 
individual productivity.  Since the companies also maintain their own on-site medical 
services, we were able to observe directly both health status and productivity for more than 
20,000 tea pluckers over a multi-year period.  The results are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Indirect costs of AIDS at commercial agriculture companies in Kenya 
 
Parameter Company 12 Company 13 
 Last 
year  
Second-to-
last year 
Last 
year 
Second-to-
last year 
Diminished productivity when at work (% 
decrease in individual output) 
22.6% 17.5% 17.4% 8.0% 
Absenteeism (additional days absent or on 
leave) 
17.0 4.7 31.0 35.5 
Transfer to less strenuous duties (additional 
days assigned to "light duty") 
n.a. n.a. 21.8 19.1 
Overall reduction in quantity of tea plucked/ 
year 
27.2% 18.9% 35.3% 28.6% 
 
The findings in Table 3 suggest that manual workers, such as tea pluckers, with HIV/AIDS 
are roughly 25-30 percent less productive over their last two years of service than they 
otherwise would be. 
 
6.  Impact of HIV/AIDS on Small and Medium-Sized Companies 
 
The vast majority of private, for-profit enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa are small or 
medium-sized, not large.  Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—defined here as 
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having between 10 and 200 employees—account for a large share of formal sector 
employment in most countries and are often regarded as the best hope for sustainable job 
creation.27;28  (Note that we are not addressing micro-enterprises—those with fewer than 10 
employees and often informally organized and reliant on family labor.) 
 
To understand the impact of HIV/AIDS on SMEs and investigate the potential for SMEs to 
play a role in fighting the epidemic, we conducted 5 surveys of representative samples of 
SMEs in various industrial sectors in South Africa, Zambia, and Kenya, as listed in Table 1.  
Small and medium sized companies are less likely than large companies to have detailed cost 
data, accurate records of absenteeism, and other information needed to make quantitative 
estimates, making it harder to evaluate the impact of AIDS on these companies.  The findings 
of the surveys—both quantitative and qualitative—about the epidemic’s impact are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  Impact of AIDS on small and medium-sized companies 
 
Study referencea Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 5 Survey 6 Survey 7 
Sample description      
Country So. Afr. So. Afr. Zambia Zambia Kenya 
Sector or location 2 province Industrial Tourism Agricult. Agricult. 
Sample size 80 34 30 29 19 
Workforce characteristics      
Median workforce size 48 53 27 46 17 
Estimated HIV prevalence in 
combined workforceb 13.7% 9.8% 24.3% 26.4% 10.0% 
Unskilled workers as % of 
combined workforce 31% 31% 36% 63% 85% 
Employee attrition (turnover) 
Total average annual attrition due 
to any cause (resignation, 
dismissal, retirement, death, etc.) 
13.0% 9.3% 12.4% 13.8% 8.4% 
Average annual attrition due to ill 
health or death 1.4% 0.9% 1.7% 1.2% 3.7% 
Proportion of total attrition 
attributable to ill health or death  10.4% 10.1% 14.5% 8.2% 45.2% 
Managers’ perceptions of current impact of AIDS on their companies 
None or little n.a.c 85% 65% 63% 72% 
Moderate n.a.c 15% 28% 37% 22% 
Severe n.a.c 0% 7% 0% 6% 
Managers’ ranking of HIV/AIDS 
as a business concern relative to 
other concerns facing companies 
9 9 5 7 3 
Companies that had ever 
discussed AIDS as a business 
issue 
38% 26% 47% 41% 37% 
aStudy references are from Table 1. 
bPrevalence estimates made by adjusting published population prevalence data to age and sex structure of combined 
workforce. 
cQuestion was not asked in this survey. 
 
Although the cost figures obtained in the SME surveys generally represented managers’ best 
guesses, rather than verified expenditures, we used them to make a rough estimate of the cost 
to small tourism companies in Zambia of losing an employee to AIDS.  In Livingstone 
District, Zambia, where Survey 5 was conducted, skilled workers accounted for the majority 
of people employed in the tourism sector and suffered most of the deaths experienced in 
2004.  We estimated that losing a skilled worker to AIDS cost the surveyed companies an 
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average of at least $1,430, equal to just over one year’s annual compensation for a worker at 
that level.  The largest components of this cost were training of a replacement worker (28% 
of the total), funeral and death benefits (23%), and paid sick leave (17%).18  The surveyed 
companies, however, lost an average of 0.6 employees/company to any health-related cause 
in the 12 months preceding the survey.  If all of these losses had been caused by AIDS and 
were among skilled workers, the average annual cost per company would have been about 
$858 per company per year.  For the median company, this amount represented roughly a 2.4 
percent increase in labor costs. Across the full sample, labor accounted for an average of 27 
percent of operating expenses. AIDS-related losses were thus estimated to increase the 
average company’s operating costs by just 0.6 percent.  Tourism companies like those in 
Survey 5 have relatively skilled workforces and invest a significant amount in training; 
agriculture companies like those in Surveys 6 and 7 likely face even smaller cost increases. 
 
The surveys thus produced a fairly consistent picture of small and medium-sized companies 
that have been only mildly affected by the AIDS epidemic so far and, as might therefore be 
expected, are not terribly concerned about it and have taken little action to address it.  In the 
next section we review evidence on company responses.   
 
7.  Company Responses to AIDS 
 
The studies described above also looked, to varying degrees, at the responses of large, 
medium-sized, and small companies to HIV/AIDS among employees.  Our research on 
company responses can be divided into three categories:  provision of services; uptake of 
services; and potential returns on investments in HIV/AIDS interventions. 
 
a.  Provision of HIV/AIDS Services 
 
Information on the current provision of HIV/AIDS services by companies in Africa was 
collected in all seven of the surveys listed in Table 1.  Results from surveys 1-2 and 4-7 are 
shown in Table 5.  (Survey 3 will be discussed below.) 
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Table 5:  Provision of HIV/AIDS services by surveyed companies 
 
Survey 
numbera 
Country 
and year 
Sector/ 
sample 
Proportion of companies that had ever undertaken  
HIV/AIDS-related activities 
   Educational 
activities, provision 
of information to 
employees 
Any other 
workplace 
prevention 
activityc 
Antiretroviral 
therapy for 
HIV-positive 
employees 
Activities 
in the 
community
1 So. Afr. 
2004 
Multiple, 2 
provinces 
15% 18% 0%d n.a.e 
2 So. Afr. 
2005 
Industrial 
area 
47% 15% 0%d n.a.e 
5 Zambia 
2005 
Tourism 47% 47% 17% 43% 
6 Zambia 
2006 
Agriculture 55% 55% 28% 34% 
7 Kenya 
2005 
Agriculture 32% 21% 0% 11% 
4 Uganda 
2004 
Multiple, 
nationalb 
54% 35% 27% n.a.e 
aSurvey numbers refer to Table 1. 
bConvenience sample of 37 companies with 25-500+ employees, including multinationals (13), parastatals (2), and locally 
owned companies (22). 
cE.g. distribution of condoms or facilitation of VCT. 
dSome companies subsidized membership in a medical aid scheme that included coverage for antiretroviral therapy, but uptake 
among employees was generally low. 
eSurvey did not ask about activities in community. 
 
Roughly half of the companies represented in Table 5 had provided information or education 
about HIV/AIDS to employees at the time of each survey.  Somewhat fewer—ranging from 
15 to 55 percent—had undertaken activities that usually require more time or effort on the 
part of the employer, such as facilitating access to VCT.  For all of these prevention 
activities, many companies reported that the materials and/or service were provided to them 
at no cost by government or an NGO.  In these instances, the company’s contribution was 
likely limited to the time of employees who participated or assisted.  No more than a quarter 
of the companies—and none of those sampled in South Africa or Kenya—were explicitly 
providing antiretroviral therapy at the time of the surveys.  It is likely that this proportion has 
increased slightly since the surveys were conducted, particularly in South Africa.  The advent 
of treatment in the public sector in all study countries beginning in 2004, however, has also 
clearly deterred some companies from spending their own funds on provision of treatment. 
By the end of 2005, employees of most of the companies surveyed in all four countries had 
some access to ART from public healthcare facilities, though waiting times at these facilities 
may be many months long. 
 
Large companies are much more likely than small or medium sized companies to make 
antiretroviral therapy for AIDS available to their employees, either by providing it directly, 
contracting with an independent disease management programme, or including it in the 
benefits provided by the company’s medical aid (health insurance) scheme.  Survey 3 elicited 
information from 52 of South Africa’s 64 private and parastatal companies with more than 
6,000 permanent employees.  As of late 2004,  roughly half of the companies surveyed made 
ART available to all permanent employees, covering 63 percent of the combined workforces 
of all 52 companies.  Access varied widely by industry, however:  all financial services 
companies and three quarters of mining companies made ART available to all employees, but 
only 21 percent of retail firms and none of the construction or community, social and 
personal services companies did so. 
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b.  Uptake of HIV/AIDS Services 
 
Provision of workplace-based services is an effective way to respond to AIDS only if 
employees agree to utilize those services.  We looked at uptake of services in two of our 
studies:  Survey 3 and Company 14.   
 
As described above, Survey 3 investigated provision and uptake of AIDS treatment services 
among South Africa’s largest private sector employers.  Although access to ART was 
widespread—some 63 percent of the nearly 1 million workers employed by the surveyed 
companies had access—uptake was low.  Across the combined workforce, for which average 
HIV prevalence was estimated at 15 percent, roughly one quarter of suspected HIV-positive 
employees were enrolled in care and treatment programs, and only 4 percent were receiving 
ART, or less than 1 percent of the entire combined workforce.  Access and uptake thus 
diverged in Survey 3:  access to services was relatively high, but use of the services was quite 
low. 
 
A different type of experience was documented in the study of Company 14, which looked at 
uptake of both testing and treatment.  Over the four year period from 2001-2005, 73 percent 
of Company 14’s workforce volunteered for an HIV test, and the testing campaign identified 
fully 87 percent of those employees believed to be HIV-positive, based on a 2003 anonymous 
seroprevalence survey.  Of the 109 employees and dependents who tested positive, 42 (39%) 
were on ART as of early 2005, including 85 percent of those employees who were medically 
eligible for ART.  Although the findings from Survey 3 and Company 3 are not strictly 
comparable—they were conducted in different countries using very different 
methodologies—they do illustrate the range of testing and treatment uptake outcomes that 
prevail among large employers.  
 
c.  Returns to Investments in Treatment Interventions 
 
The benefits of workplace interventions to employers are largely unquantified.  The 
effectiveness of HIV prevention efforts is notoriously difficult to measure, and to our 
knowledge no quantitative, outcomes-based evaluations of workplace prevention programs 
have ever been published.  From an employer’s perspective, the net benefits of preventing an 
HIV infection are of course the “avoided costs” of that infection, minus the cost of the 
prevention program itself.  Since basic prevention interventions tend to be relatively 
inexpensive, the average cost of an AIDS-related termination shown in Table 2 can be taken 
as a rough estimate of the savings to a company for each incident infection prevented.  These 
savings will only accrue, however, 8-9 years after the infection is prevented—the average 
latency period for HIV—and should thus be discounted accordingly.  They will also only 
accrue if the employee in question is still in the workforce when HIV-related illness 
develops.  The long time lag between prevention costs, which are incurred now, and 
prevention benefits, which accrue years later, makes it difficult for private sector employers 
to capture the financial benefits of investments in prevention. 
 
The benefits of treatment are somewhat easier to estimate, both empirically and through 
modeling.  Many of the companies listed in Table 1 now make HIV/AIDS care and treatment, 
including antiretroviral therapy, available to employees.  We modeled the “returns to 
investment” in AIDS treatment for the companies using the cost results shown in Table 2 and 
a hypothetical treatment program with the following characteristics:   
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• Treatment begins 2 years before an HIV-positive employee would otherwise have been 
expected to die of AIDS-related causes, and employees who start treatment today will be 
able to remain in the workforce for an average of 5 years longer than would otherwise be 
expected.  Treatment is thus required for a total of 7 years per eligible employee. 
• After 5 years, treatment is assumed to fail, leading to a period of illness and then death 
similar to that experienced in the absence of treatment.   
• There will be some additional absenteeism and reduced productivity associated with 
initiating and sustaining therapy, which we will assume to equal 25 percent of that 
associated with untreated HIV/AIDS. 
• Once treatment fails, employees can be retired for medical reasons immediately, 
curtailing the rest of the high absenteeism and low productivity that characterizes AIDS-
related deaths now.  Upon medical retirement, no further benefits are provided, 
eliminating all death- and funeral-related benefits. 
• Because company managers will have ample lead time to plan for AIDS-related attrition, 
the loss of productivity related to vacancies and to the inexperience of replacement 
employees will cost 25 percent of what they do in the absence of treatment.  Direct costs 
of recruitment and training a replacement worker will remain the same. 
• Future costs and benefits are not discounted.  The appropriate discount rate to use for 
each company varies and can greatly affect the results, so a consistent rate of 0 percent 
was applied to all. 
• Treatment costs $360/patient/year ($30/month).  Exchange rates used were those 
prevailing in the year of the study. 
 
Results of the modeling for selected companies are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6:  Net benefits of employer sponsored treatment for selected large companies 
 
Net benefit per employee treated Study 
reference 
Country and sector 
Manager Skilled 
worker 
Unskilled 
worker 
Net benefit for 
treatment of all eligible 
permanent employeesa 
Co. 6  Manufacturing, S. Afr. $9,683 $3,751 $1,955 $49,326 
Co. 10 Tourism, Zambia $8,604 $1,577 $657 $25,081 
Co. 12 Agriculture, Kenya $17,999 -$673 -$2,278 -$172,227 
aAssumes that 100% of eligible permanent employees are treated. 
 
Table 6 suggests that for many businesses, such as Companies 6 and 10, providing ART 
under the (admittedly strict) conditions of our hypothetical program would result in net 
financial savings.  For these companies, ensuring that employees have access to and utilize 
treatment services is beneficial to everyone involved.  Company 12 represents a different 
outcome:  treating managers is highly profitable, because they are both expensive to lose and 
difficult to replace, but treating unskilled and even skilled workers will not produce an 
immediate financial gain.  Most labor intensive, relatively low-technology industries such as 
textiles, agribusiness, construction, and contract services like security and cleaning will face 
this situation.  This is likely to be particularly true of those that are locally owned and lack 
both resources and pressure from an international head office.  These companies often make 
treatment available to managers and selected skilled employees on an ad hoc basis but rely on 
the public sector to care for the majority of HIV-positive workers. 
 
Company 10, a large tourism company in Zambia, presented an interesting development in 
the business response to AIDS.  As Table 2 indicates, modeling from population data 
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suggests that HIV prevalence in Company 10’s workforce was extremely high—more than 
one out of three employees—and that the resulting increase in labor costs should have 
approached 11 percent, by far the largest “AIDS tax” that we have seen.  Observed AIDS-
related mortality, however, was only about 25 percent of predicted mortality—and the 
company’s actual AIDS tax was thus only 2-3 percent, in line with that of most other 
companies in Table 2.  One explanation for the lower-than-expected mortality was the 
youthfulness of the workforce:  the average age of Company 10’s employees was just 32, and 
most of those with HIV were probably not yet symptomatic.  A second explanation was that 
many employees were already on ART, provided by either the public program at the district 
hospital or a private doctor in the nearby town.  The patient numbers reported by these two 
providers were sufficient to explain virtually all of the discrepancy between expected and 
observed mortality.  Our study concluded that Company 10 may represent a new trend in 
African workforces:  high HIV prevalence but low AIDS mortality, as a result of access to 
antiretroviral therapy. 
 
There are several uncertainties that will influence the effect of ART on worker survival and 
productivity, and thus on the net benefits of a treatment intervention from a company’s 
perspective.  First, employees have to agree to be tested and, if positive, enroll in the 
treatment programme.  Experience with uptake varies widely:  Company 14 has enrolled 
nearly 90 percent of estimated HIV-positive employees in its care and treatment program, but 
in South Africa, Survey 3 found uptake of treatment to be very low at most very large 
companies.  Second, high levels of ARV adherence will have to be sustained over the long 
term.  In principal, individuals whose survival depends on remaining healthy enough to 
perform their jobs should be highly motivated to adhere, but there is bound to be some falling 
off of adherence over time.  A treated but non-adherent workforce population is unlikely to 
be highly productive.  Finally, some loss of productivity may result from treatment itself, due 
both to toxicities (side effects) from the ARVs and queuing time required to obtain services 
in the public sector.  As noted above, queues at public clinics can last for many hours, and 
current ART guidelines typically require many clinic visits, especially in the first year. 
 
8.  Conclusions   
 
Although the companies included in our studies do not approach a representative sample of 
all formal sector employers in Africa, clear patterns have emerged that we believe to be 
generalizable to many countries and industries.  Based on the data reported above and our 
broader experience in conducting this research and reviewing the literature, we draw the ten 
following conclusions about HIV/AIDS and the private sector in Africa. 
 
1. The impact of HIV/AIDS on firms’ labor costs has so far been real but moderate. 
 
In most, though not all, of the studies we have conducted, HIV/AIDS has been found to 
increase labor costs by less than 3 percent.  Broadly speaking, companies that employ large 
numbers of unskilled or semi-skilled workers are likely to have a high prevalence of HIV 
infection in the workforce, but each employee who acquires HIV/AIDS costs the employer 
relatively little.  Companies that rely primarily on skilled staff will face larger costs per HIV-
positive employee, but the number of employees with HIV/AIDS is likely to be small, and 
the share of labor costs in overall operating expenses may also be relatively low.  AIDS is 
affecting the private sector companies in Table 1 less severely than it is the government 
agencies we have studied.18  There are exceptions to this rule, however, as demonstrated by 
the mining company in Botswana and the tourism company in Zambia, to which untreated 
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AIDS is estimated to have increased labor costs by 6 percent and 11 percent , respectively.  
Most of the large companies we studied, moreover, were multinationals and/or exporters.  
Uncritical generalizations may therefore be risky.  The magnitude and nature of the impact of 
AIDS on business is also liable to change over time, as local epidemics mature, access to 
treatment expands, and companies adapt in other ways.   
  
2. A few variables explain most of the differences in costs among firms. 
 
There is a good deal of variation across and within countries and sectors, but there is also 
some consistency in the drivers of costs.  First, as one would expect, costs to employers vary 
with HIV prevalence in the workforce population.  Estimated prevalence in the companies 
shown in Table 2 ranged from under 6 percent to more than 35 percent.  Second, the job level 
of affected employees is important, as morbidity and mortality among more skilled (and 
higher paid) employees impose higher costs on employers than they do among less skilled 
employees.  Third, the structure of employment also plays a role:  contract and casual 
workers typically receive few or no employee benefits and can easily be dismissed and 
replaced when they fall ill.  Fourth, company ownership matters:  multinational companies, 
parastatals, and companies with a history of foreign or colonial ownership tend to provide 
more extensive employee benefits and invest more in training, and they thus face higher costs 
when employees become ill or die.  Finally, costs vary to some extent by industrial sector:  on 
average, mining and manufacturing firms face higher costs than service and agricultural 
firms, probably as a result of differences in capital intensity, labour productivity, and 
workforce demographics.  Differences within sectors may equal or exceed differences 
between sectors, however. 
 
3. Responses to AIDS are also associated with consistent company characteristics. 
 
Just as there are common determinants of the cost of AIDS to employers, there are several 
factors consistently associated with a more active management response to the epidemic.  
Small companies that lack dedicated human resources staff and that tend to interact with 
individual employees on the basis of personal relationships, rather than company policies, are 
unlikely to have formal HIV/AIDS programs.  Large firms with professional human resource 
departments, occupational health departments, and/or on-site medical expertise are more 
likely to establish a workplace AIDS policy, secure access to medical care, including ART, 
for HIV-positive employees, and provide other HIV-related services and benefits.  
Multinational and parastatal companies are also more likely to take action.  Multinationals 
often follow the lead of their head offices, which sometimes provide expertise and assistance 
to local operations, as well as setting company policy.  Even in these firms, however, 
individual champions may still be necessary for policy change.  As with many collective 
actions, the personal experience and initiative of individuals—managers, union 
representatives, human resource officers—may be as important as institutional factors in 
determining a company’s response to AIDS. 
 
4. Treatment is a good investment for many employers. 
 
Chronic illness in the workforce is expensive for most employers, particularly when it ends 
with the payment of large death benefits and replacement costs.  As the price of effective 
treatment has fallen, the estimated net financial benefits to employers of making ART 
available (paying for and, in some cases, directly providing) to employees have turned 
positive for increasing numbers of companies.  Even for those for which there is a net cost, 
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rather than net saving—such as Company 12, as shown in Table 6—the cost of treatment is 
partially offset by the benefits.  There are also many other unmeasured and/or non-financial 
benefits of providing treatment to employees, including reducing the time managers must 
spend coping with employee deaths and turnover, mitigating the impact of AIDS on  
workforce morale, motivation, and discipline, stemming the loss of skill and experience from 
the workforce, and allowing a company to respond compassionately to the crisis facing its 
employees. 
 
5. Businesses have other ways to respond to the cost of HIV/AIDS. 
 
Most research and advocacy about the business response to AIDS have focused on HIV-
specific programs and policies.  Companies have other ways of averting the costs of AIDS, 
however.12  The private sector has greater scope than other employers to shift the economic 
burden of AIDS onto government, nongovernmental organizations, households, and 
individuals.  Common practices that shift the AIDS burden from businesses to others include 
pre-employment screening, reduced employee benefits, restructured employment contracts, 
outsourcing of less skilled jobs, selective retrenchments, and changes in production 
technologies.  Contracting out of previously permanent jobs (“casualization”), for example, 
shields firms from benefits and turnover costs, effectively shifting to households, NGOs, and 
government the responsibility to care for affected workers and their families.  These changes 
appear to be underway, to varying degrees, throughout the countries we have studied.  Many 
of these changes are primarily responses to globalization and would have occurred in the 
absence of AIDS.  The opportunity to minimize the costs of AIDS-related illness and death, 
however, may hasten or intensify trends outsourcing and benefits caps.  
 
6. Employer provision of treatment can make sense even when public sector treatment is 
available. 
 
A development that is related to, but separate from, the “burden shift” described above is that 
of large companies choosing to rely on the public sector or on individual employees to pay 
for treatment.  Both companies we studied in Ethiopia (Companies 15 and 16), for example, 
originally paid for ART for employees but shifted them to public clinics once treatment fees 
were eliminated in the public sector.  If a company does not pay for treatment, an employee 
with AIDS can either pay for private care himself or, where available, access a public sector 
treatment program.  In these cases, the direct cost of treatment is transferred to the household 
or government, but the employer realizes the savings from the worker’s continued 
productivity.  Serious drawbacks to this strategy remain, however.  First, in many places, 
each visit to a public sector treatment clinic requires a full day of queuing, such that treatment 
itself increases work absenteeism.  Second, without a structured program, a company has no 
way to encourage or evaluate uptake of treatment or adherence to ART.  Treatment of 
employees with AIDS is thus hit or miss, and the company will continue to incur the costs of 
AIDS-related morbidity and mortality.  As a result, many large companies in South Africa 
and elsewhere have concluded that continuing to pay for private disease management services 
is a worthwhile investment, despite rapidly expanding public sector programs.25 
 
7. For most small and medium-sized companies, HIV/AIDS is not a pressing issue. 
 
The surveys of SMEs in South Africa, Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda consistently found that 
HIV/AIDS ranked well below several other business issues as a concern for senior managers.  
Few managers report ever having discussed AIDS as a business issue, and fewer still believe 
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that AIDS is having a serious impact on their companies.  Most perceive little pressure to act 
from employees, shareholders, or other constituencies.  While some managers may simply be 
misinformed, it seems unlikely that business leaders are systematically failing to notice 
sustained, major effects of the epidemic.  A more likely explanation is that companies in 
Africa—and particular small and medium-sized companies—face myriad challenges to 
staying in business, ranging from power failures to high and unpredictable taxes to political 
instability.  In such an environment, AIDS ranks low on the management agenda. 
 
8. Small and  medium sized companies do not have the resources to develop HIV/AIDS 
programs. 
 
Most companies that have implemented an active HIV/AIDS program have relied on 
dedicated human resources staff to lead the effort.  Small and medium-sized companies 
typically do not have human resources staff, and other managers do not see enough impact to 
justify the investment of their own time to understand the epidemic, research the response 
options, and put them in place.  Other deterrents to investing in HIV/AIDS programs include 
relatively high employee turnover, lack of redundancy in the workforce that would allow 
individual workers to take time out to participate in HIV-related activities, individual rather 
than policy-driven relationships with employees, high discount rates, and a dearth of 
available cash.  Smaller companies, moreover, cannot benefit from the economies of scale 
available to large companies.  In a survey of HIV/AIDS service providers conducted in South 
Africa in 2004, we found that private service providers charged smaller companies—those 
with fewer than 250 employees—2-3 times more per employee than they charged larger 
companies.29  Expectations that large numbers of SMEs can be persuaded to establish 
HIV/AIDS programs without support from business associations may therefore be unrealistic.  
Greater societal benefits may be obtained, moreover, by encouraging SMEs to focus on job 
creation, and relying on governments and NGOs to provide healthcare. 
 
9. Almost nothing is known about the effectiveness of workplace HIV/AIDS  interventions. 
 
Many companies throughout sub-Saharan Africa have taken the advice of public health 
professionals over the past 15 years and implemented active HIV prevention programs, 
including education and awareness campaigns, training of peer educators, distribution of 
condoms, treatment and prevention of other STIs, and promotion of HIV testing.  Despite 
more than a decade of experience, there is virtually no quantitative research to indicate 
whether these interventions have reduced HIV transmission substantially, marginally, or not 
at all.  One reason for the lack of evidence is common to HIV prevention in general:  it is 
notoriously difficult to measure HIV prevention outcomes outside of clinic trials.  Workplace 
settings are even more problematic, due to workforce turnover, changes in management 
policies and approaches over time, and inability to control for the effects of external changes, 
such as rising HIV awareness and risk reduction in the general population.  It is reasonable to 
assume that prevention strategies that appear to be effective in the general population, such as 
promotion of VCT, are also effective in employed populations.  Even for these “hard” 
interventions, however, it is difficult to quantify the benefits of workplace prevention 
investments. 
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10.  Little is known about the effect of ART on worker productivity or labor costs.  
 
Highly active antiretroviral therapy has been shown to extend survival and reduce 
HIV/AIDS-related morbidity in the vast majority of patients.30;31  Although most research 
comes from U.S. and European populations, there is a growing body of evidence from Africa 
to suggest that treatment with ARVs is also effective in suppressing viral replication and 
restoring immune functions in African populations.32-34  What is less clear is the extent to 
which ART will restore the productivity of workers and diminish the costs of untreated 
AIDS.  The modeling in Table 6 assumed, arbitrarily, that treated workers would be 75 
percent as productive as HIV-negative workers, but there is so far no evidence to support this 
assumption.  Preliminary findings by other researchers are promising:  absenteeism among 
Anglo American mineworkers, for example, returned to pre-AIDS levels approximately 6 
months after initiating ART.35  We and others currently engaged in research to evaluate the 
effectiveness of ART in reducing the impact of AIDS on labor productivity and costs; results 
are likely to be available by 2007.   
 
This paper has summarized six years of research on AIDS and the private sector in Africa.  It 
has not been intended as a comprehensive literature review, but rather as a synthesis of a set 
of related studies.  These studies have documented costs and impacts that are less damaging 
than many researchers and activists originally believed.  On the other hand, the work has also 
strongly suggested that well-designed interventions can achieve the double benefit of 
reducing costs to employers while saving the lives and improving the welfare of individual 
employees.  Rigorous evaluation of the outcomes and sustainability of interventions—
including HIV prevention and care, as well as antiretroviral treatment—is now the highest 
priority on the AIDS and business research agenda. 
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